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PROPERTY
I. CONDEMATION
City of Greenwood v. Psomas,1 a condemnation proceeding,
presents a property question as well as an interesting collateral
problem in procedure. Pursuant to South Carolina Code section
25-161, providing for condemnation by municipalities, the city of
Greenwood acquired land subject to a life estate in Pansy Psomas,
a succeeding life estate in her minor son, George, with a remain-
der to parties unknown. Club Soda, Inc. and Ralph W. Alexan-
der, also respondents in the case, had a short term lease on this
property with an option to renew. In a jury trial the landowners
were represented by counsel; however, the lessees, though entitled
to be represented at their election and named as parties, were
not represented. The jury returned an undivided verdict of
$31,9311.50, representing the fair market value of the entire prop-
erty and the interests of all parties. The landowners moved for
a new trial and were refused. Shortly thereafter the court ad-
journed sine die and the judge left the circuit. At no time during
the trial or argument on the landowners' motion for a new trial
did the lessees raise any question as to their lease or the form or
amount of the jury's verdict. A month later the lessees moved to
have a case as to their interest docketed for jury trial. The trial
judge held a hearing a week later, and ruled that he had juris-
diction to entertain the lessees' motion after stne die adjourn-
ment. He then ruled that the interests of the lessees had not been
adjudicated in the condemnation trial and granted their motion
for a new trial as to their interests. The case came to the supreme
court on an appeal from the trial judge's ruling by the City of
Greenwood.
The property question is this: Did the lower court record indi-
cate that .it would or should have been possible for the jury to
make divided findings as to the interests of the landowners and
those of the lessees? The lessees were contending that their inter-
ests were not in any way determined by the trial. This same
problem was at issue in the fairly recent case of South Carolina
Highway Department v. Hammond.2 In that case, the landowner
rather than the lessees complained that her interest was improp-
erly joined with those of the lessees and that the court erred in
not granting a motion for separate trial for determination of her
1. 155 S.E.2d 310 (S.C. 1967).
2. 238 S.C. 317, 120 S.E2d 21 (1961).
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damages. The court pointed out that at the initiation of con-
demnation proceedings all owners were served with notice of
condemnation. "The word 'owner,"' they said, "as used in the
condemnation statute has been construed to embrace not only
the owner of the fee, but a lessee and any other person who has
an interest in the property .... 113 The court also pointed out
that in a condemnation proceeding, the Highway Department,
and presumably any other entity entitled to assert the power of
eminent domain, was entitled to "an assessment of all damages
arising by virtue of the taking in a single proceeding,"4 con-
sonant with the well settled policy of avoiding multiplicity of
actions. Plaintiff landowner in Hammond was denied a new
trial.
The court in the instant case quotes Hammond language on
the above point extensively. Analyzing the Psomas facts, it notes
that the jury was given various estimates from appraisers who
stated that their appraisals took in to account all interests in-
cluding lease interests. The jury did not hear testimony either
as to the fair market value of each separate interest or as to the
landowners' interest to the exclusion of the lessees' interest. The
court concluded that it would have been impossible for the jury
to have made any finding other than one of the fair market value
of the entire property and all interests in it. Further, the court
observed, the lessees were well aware of this action, the case
having been docketed in the usual fashion, and thus had every
opportunity to participate in the litigation. This decision serves
as a warning to future condemnees of whatever interest that
the court will not direct the jury to bring in a divided verdict
on its own motion. Therefore condemnees must participate so
as to raise the valuation of the entire property instead of relying
on future litigation for full compensation.
An ancillary issue in this case was the question of whether
the circuit judge exceeded his authority and jurisdiction by
hearing the motion after adjourning sine die. The court paid
only the most cursory attention to this problem, giving it only a
sentence of attention as they ruled: "We are also of the opinion
that the circuit judge did have jurisdiction to rule upon this
3. Id. at 320, 120 S.E.2d at 22; accord, Woodstock Hardwood & Spool Mfg.
Co. v, Charleston Light & Power Co., 84 S.C. 306, 66 S.E. 194 (1909) (cited
in the Psomnas decision); Charleston & W. C. Ry. Co. v. Reynolds, 69 S.C. 481,
48 S.E. 476 (1904); cf. Ross v. Railway Co., 33 S.C. 477, 12 S.E. 101 (1890).
4. South Carolina Highway Dep't v. Hammond, 238 S.C. 317,320, 120 S.E.2d
21, 22 (1961).
[Vol. 19
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matter under all the circumstances of the case. ' 5 The holding is
too narrow to permit any interpretation of broad authority for
future circuit judges in this situation. Apparently the court
agreed with the trial judge's assessment of his authority:
Counsel for the City of Greenwood objected to the jurisdic-
tion of the court since the court had previously adjourned
sine die. However, the court is satisfied of its jurisdiction
while still sitting as presiding judge to dispose of a ques-
tion arising from such an intimate connection with a case
tried before the court.6
However, as the appellant, City of Greenwood, pointed out,
there was no dispute that the circuit court, in unusual circum-
stances, has the authority to grant a new trial nisi or a new trial
on new and unusual grounds. 7 Since the respondent's motion
was for further trial, even in the face of the unquestioned fact
that all interested parties were before the court on the first trial,
the judge should grant one or the other.
II. "TAXING" OF PROPERTY BY A MUNIOIPALTIT
Unquestionably the most interesting case in the property area
for this survey period is Kline v. City of Columbia,8 a decision
of real iceberg proportions. On the surface, the case states a few
well known and settled property axioms, but many view this case
as an almost total abrogation of municipal tort immunity in the
property area. Considering South Carolina's well-settled policy
of stare decisis, the implications of this decision will haunt
municipal and state attorneys for years to come.
Kline involves two actions by property owners Ella and Lena
Kline and Kline Supply Company against the City of Columbia
and South Carolina Electric & Gas Company for damages to
their building and its contents, allegedly the result of an ex-
plosion in the walls and under the floor and subsequent fire in
the building, caused by the contact of leaking gas with a sus-
pended gas heater.
For some weeks prior to the accident, the city had been widen-
ing Huger Street on which Kline Supply Company is located.
5. City of Greenwood v. Psomas, 155 S.E2d 310, 314 (S.C. 1967).
6. Record at 46, City of Greenwood v. Psomas, 155 S.E2d 310 (S.C. 1967).
7. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-1215 (1962). See Gwathmey v. Foor Hotel Co.,
121 S.C. 237, 113 S.E. 688 (1922).
8. 155 S.E2d 597 (S.C. 1967).
19671
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The complaint charged the city with: (a) negligently pulling
loose a gas line which ran under Huger Street to Kline Supply,
(b) failing to notify South Carolina Electric & Gas to cut off
the gas supply after the city's agents and servants knew or
should have known that gas was escaping, and (c) subsequently
failing to notify the company after the city foreman was advised
that his crew had ruptured the line. These allegations seemed
to make the complaint sound in tort. In addition, the complaint
alleged that plaintiff-respondent's damages amounted to a taking
of property by the sovereign, which entitled them to just com-
pensation.
In South Carolina, a municipality can be sued in tort only by
leave of specific authorization from the General Assembly. The
respondents claimed their authorization under South Carolina
Code section 47-709 which provides for liability of a municipal
corporation for property or personal damages resulting from
defects in streets and mismanagement of anything under the
municipality's control which occurs within its boundaries. This
mismanagement has been interpreted to mean only that which
occurs in connection with street maintenance, repair, or the city's
obligation to keep streets safe.10
South Carolina's specific authorization requirement is some-
what unique. Traditional American tort law, as regards a mu-
nicipality's right to claim governmental immunity to suits
without consent, views the municipal corporation as a split per-
sonality. It has a governmental personality in which it carries
out those duties delegated to it by the state, but it also has a
proprietary or corporate character, just as other business enter-
prises do. Usually when a city is sued in tort, it is sued because of
negligence which occurred in its proprietary or private role.
South Carolina is one of two states which refuses to recognize
this split personality. The result in South Carolina is complete
municipal immunity, except for specific authorization of liabil-
ity by the General Assembly."
9. S.C. CODE ANN. § 47-70 (1962).
10. For a general history of the policy behind the statute and the various
changes in its interpretation, see Jackson v. Columbia, 174 S.C. 208, 177 S.E.
158 (1934). For more recent developments in interpretation see Furr v. Rock
Hill, 235 S.C. 44, 109 S.E.2d 697 (1959) ; Hicks v. Columbia, 225 S.C. 553, 83
S.E.2d 199 (1954) ; Abernathy v. Columbia, 213 S.C. 68, 48 S.E.2d 585 (1948);
Bozard v. Orangeburg, 197 S.C. 447, 15 S.E.2d 642 (1941).
11. A concise statement of the development of this doctrine and mention of
South Carolina's position can be found in W. PRossER, LAW OF ToRTs § 125,
at 1004-10 (3d ed. 1964).
[Vol. 19
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Plaintiff-respondents also claimed a remedy under Article I,
section 17 of the South Carolina Constitution, which provides:
"Private property shall not be taken for . . . public use without
just compensation being first made therefor."'12 Respondents
alleged that the acts of the city constituted a taking for which
they were entitled to just compensation. The case was before
the supreme court on an appeal from the lower court's overruling
of the city's demurrer and denial of its motion to strike the sec-
tions of plaintiff's complaint described above.
The court first considered the question of whether the plain-
tiffs had stated a cause of action under the constitutional pro-
vision. The court characterized the city's action of widening the
street as an aggressive and willful act and stated that the city
was "engaged in the exercise of a power ordinarily, though not
necessarily, exercised under the power of eminent domain.' u3
Since the court later reiterates the well established South Caro-
lina position of using a broad view of "taking," equating it to the
"least actual damage"'14 as opposed to the stricter federal view, in
which there must be a showing of intent, it seems at first glance
curious that the court would find it at all necessary to find intent
here. The reason becomes clear when one reads the 1958 case of
Collins v. City of Greenville,'5 relied on heavily by the city
here. The only factual distinction between Collins and Kline is
that in Collins the city was negligent from the beginning in that
it allowed a sewer to become clogged and then damaged the
plaintiff when it unclogged the main. The Collins plaintiff was
unsuccessful. It would seem that the intent evidenced in Kline
is no more definite than that in Collins.
The court characterized the city's action in Kline as an in-
vasion. Yet because it approves recovery under the constitution,
the court states that it is unnecessary to rule on the question of
whether a valid cause of action is also stated under section 47-70,
the tort action discussed above. It ruled that the specifications
of negligence in those sections of the complaint must be struck.
The problem with Kline is that the whole case sounds in tort,
whether one chooses to strike tort language in the complaint or
not. Thus, Kline could be seen as a real turning point in the
erosion of South Carolina's strict sovereign immunity doctrine.
12. S.C. CONST. art. I, § 17.
13. Kline v. City of Columbia, 155 S.E2d 597, 599 (S.C. 1967).
14. Id. at 599, citing Webb v. Greenwood County, 229 S.C. 267, 92 S.E.2d
688 (1956).
15. 233 S.C. 506, 105 S.E2d 704 (1958).
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Except for the court's subtle distinguishing of Collins, Kline
could be interpreted as an open invitation to tort suits against
the sovereign in the property area. 6 Kline must be read with
Collins to avoid this conclusion, and even then one is forced to
infer this limitation. The court itself does not draw this line.
On the basis of Kline sovereign immunity from tort liability as
regards real and personal property damage seems to have been
severely weakened if not abrogated by this "back door" property
law route.
III. Tnm GHosT OF THE RuiL IN SnEv Y's CASE PAST 
Hydriek v. Greene17 is a hybrid wills and property case in
which the resolution of disputed rights to possession of land in
Orangeburg County could be settled only by a construction of
a provision in the will of a testatrix who died in 1920 leaving a
will dated February 11th of that year. The relevant section reads
as follows:
Sixth. I give my Ninety-six Road place, containing 550
acres, more or less, and my River Road place, containing
270 acres, more or less, both in Orangeburg County . . . to
my brother, Dr. D. J. Hydrick, my sister, Margaret H.
Caval, my brother, John H. Hydrick, and my nephew, Jack
Lawton Hydrick ... to be divided amongst them ... into
four parts, as nearly as equal in value as possible . . . and
each of them shall have the part so assigned to him for life,
and after his death, it shall go to his "issue" per stirpes,
as purchasers. But if any of these should die without issue,
his share shall go to the survivors upon the same limitations
as their original shares, and so on to the last survivor. And
if all of them shall die without leaving issue, the whole
shall be added to the Hydrick Memorial Scholarship fund
hereinafter provided.' 8
Under this provision, John H. Hydrick received a tract of 285.8
acres of land in 1920 which was sold by the county sheriff in
1925 for delinquent taxes. Defendants Byrd and Hutto are the
successors in interest of the 1925 purchaser. In 1964, John H.
Hydrick died, survived by his three children, John H. Hydrick,
Jr., the plaintiff, and Mary H. Greene and A. S. Hydrick, de-
fendants only for the purpose of an ancillary partition proceed-
16. Excluding, of course, torts involving injury to person.
17. 154 S.E.2d 565 (S.C. 1967).
18. Id. at 565-66.
[VOl. 19
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ing not in issue in this appeal. The three children claim that
Byrd and Hlutto held only such estate as Hydrick, Sr. had, which
was, they contend, a life estate. They claim that, as remaindermen
under their aunt's will, they are now entitled to the land as ten-
ants in common. Byrd and Hutto characterize Hydrick, Sr.'s
estate as a fee simple conditional and contend that the birth of
children fulfilled the condition and gave him the right to alien-
ate. The appellants reach this conclusion by arguing that since
the will was executed and probated prior to the 1924 repeal of
the Rule in Shelley's case, the rule operated to give Hydrick, Sr.
a fee simple conditional.
At first glance the appellant's argument seems persuasive.
The requirements of the rule are: "(a) a conveyance or devise of
land, (b) containing a life estate in the ancestor, and (c) a re-
mainder in the heirs or heirs of the body of such ancestor, (d)
created by the same conveyance or devise, and (e) of the same
quality as the life estate." 9 These requirements seem to be met
by the above described limitation. The only phrase which pre-
vents an immediate conclusion for operation of the rule is the
phrase "it shall go to his issue per stirpes, as purchasers." One
of the sacred axioms learned by first year property students is
that, by virtue of Lord Mansfield's proclamation of 17010,20 the
Rule in Shelley's Case is a rule of law and not a rule of con-
struction. Thus, in a limitation "to A for life, remainder to his
heirs," or "heirs of his body" or "issue," "heirs" or "issue" are
read as words of limitation, indicating the character and con-
ditions of the estate to A, and not words of purchase, indicat-
ing a separate estate to the issue. As Simes points out: "If the
requirements of the rule are otherwise met, no assertion in the
instrument that the rule is not to apply has any effect." 21 The
South Carolina Supreme Court had never been presented with
this precise set of facts before, but in Hillman v. Bouslaugh,
22
cited as persuasive authority by the defendants,2 the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court faced a similar limitation 24 and ruled
19. L. SimEs, FUTuPE INTER.STS § 23, at 48 (2d ed. 1966).
20. Perrin v. Blake, 98 Eng. Rep. 355 (K.B. 1770).
21. L. Simis, supra note 19, § 24, at 52.
22. 50 Pa. 344 (1850).
23. Brief for Appellants at 16-17, Hydrick v. Greene, 154 S.E.2d 565 (S.C.
1967).
24. There were three slightly and not significantly different versions of the
limitations. One of these read as follows: "to ... Ester Bouslaugh, during her
natural life, and then, after her decease, then, to the heirs of her body, to them,
their heirs and assigns forever .... " Hillman v. Bouslaugh, 50 Pa. 344, 345-
46 (1850).
1967]
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against the argument for a words of purchase construction of
"heirs"; stating:
It is admitted, that the rule subverts a particular inten-
tion in perhaps every instance; for, as was said in Roe v.
Bedford, 4 Maule & Selw. 363, it is proof against even an
express declaration that heirs shaZl tate as purchasers.
25
South Carolina, however, long before the repeal of the Rule in
Shelley's Case, had shown a marked tendency to restrict this
intent defeating rule in cases in which additional words evi-
denced a clear intent -not to use the "tainted" words to denote an
indefinite line of descent.26 This has been especially true when
the word "issue" rather than "heirs of the body" has been used.
27
This position was made very clear in Green v. Green28 in which
the only qualifying words to the remainder clause containing
the phrase "to the lawful issue of her body" was a subsequent
phrase "issue to take per stirpes"29 and yet the court held against
application of the rule. Whether Rule in Shelley's Case purists,
such as the Pennsylvania judge mentioned above, would agree
with that sort of erosion of the Perrin v. Bla7ke axiom, and clear-
ly this is substantial rationalization of that axiom, the instant
controversy presents an even stronger case for non-application.
As the court pointed out:
[The will under scrutiny here] was obviously prepared by a
skilled draftsman who knew the meaning of the words
used....
We are not left in doubt in this case as to the meaning of
the word "issue" ... . [T]he testatrix clearly expressed a
purpose that "issue" was not used as a word of limitation but
one of purchase .... As stated by the circuit judge, "when
Mrs. Caskey [the testatrix] used the phrase 'as purchasers'
in defining the word 'issue' she, in effect, said that the issue
of John Henry Hydrick, Sr., shall take as a class on his
death directly from me and not as his heirs."30
25. Id. at 351 (emphasis added).
26. See Blythe v. Goode, 269 F. 544 (4th Cir. 1920); McIntyre v. McIntyre,
16 S.C. 290 (1881).
27. Woodle v. Tilghman, 234 S.C. 127, 129-33, 107 S.E.2d 4, 7-9 (1959).
The circuit judge set out a detailed discussion of this matter in his order.
Record at 23-25, Hydrick v. Greene, 154 S.E.2d 565 (S.C. 1967).
28. 210 S.C. 391, 42 S.E.2d 884 (1947).
29. Id. at 394, 42 S.E2d at 885.
30. Hydrick v. Greene, 154 S.E.2d 565, 567 (S.C. 1967).
[Vol. -19
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South Carolina does have an open and fair-minded approach to
the Rule in Shelley's Case, but this case is a reminder that this
1924 ghost still rattles its chains occasionally raising a sufficient
din to strike fear or arouse morbid curiosity in the hearts of the
beleaguered South Carolina title searchers.
IV. RESTmCTIV COVENANTS
A. At What Price Quiet Tte?
MHcullough v. Urquhart31 involved an action to affirm title
and declare void alleged restrictive covenants on the land in
question. In 1938, a group of individuals interested in creating
a residential development acquired a 236 acre tract in what is
now Forest Acres, a suburb of Columbia. 100 acres of this area
became Jackson Heights. In February 1946, the trustee for the
developers Urquhart and plaintiff McCullough entered into a
contract of sale for four lots shown on a recorded plat of Jackson
Heights. In June of that year the owners, having decided to
change to corporate form, conveyed all unsold lots to Jackson
Heights Corporation. Through inadvertence, three of the four
lots were omitted from this deed. In February of 1947, the newly
formed Jackson Heights Corporation gave McCullough a deed
purporting to convey all four lots. This deed contained the fol-
lowing restriction: "Each lot shall be used only for private resi-
dential purposes and there shall be no more than one residence
on any lot."132 McCullough was aware of this restriction at the
time of sale. Since this sale he has used three of the lots commer-
cially for the planting and selling of shrubbery.
The only issue before the court on appeal from the circuit
court's affirmance of the master's report was the question of
whether the property was subject to the restrictions, title having
been affirmed without appeal. The plaintiff took the position
that the deed was void ab initio and, thus, the restrictive cove-
nants therein not binding. Their correlative contention was claim
of title by adverse possession under color of the deed. The de-
fendants' main position was that the plaintiffs cannot claim
under color of the deed and at the same time attempt to escape
the conditions of it. In addition the defendants made the argu-
ment that even if the title were acquired by adverse possession,
the restrictions would be binding under the theory of negative
equitable easements.
31. 248 S.C. 348, 149 S.E2d 909 (1966).
32. Id. at 351, 149 SYE2d at 911.
19671
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The court based its decision for the defendants on the theory
of estoppel as set out in Cruger v. Daniel.33 There the court
stated:
[A]ll parties and privies are bound by an estoppel. An
estoppel is reciprocal, and binds both parties. Co. Lit., 352, a.
A person making a conveyance, who has no title at the time,
but afterwards acquires one, is estopped to deny that he was
seized at the time of conveyance. So a party accepting a
conveyance is estopped to deny his grantor's title.34
The court pointed out that though the corporation had no
record title to the property at the time of conveyance, the indi-
vidual owners, who were also the stockholders of the corporation,
authorized it to convey title and, thus, represented that the
corporation had the right to do so. The court stated: "It is pat-
ently true, as stated by the Master in Equity, that 'if they had
claimed the McCullough lots because of the error in naming the
grantor, no court of equity would sustain their position.' "35
The court concluded that if the record holders are estopped to
claim invalidity, so also are the plaintiffs under the Jruger
reasoning. The court then held that the deed was effective not
only to convey title, but also to bind all parties under the restric-
tions contained therein.
This decision seems correct if one accepts the reasoning of the
estoppel theory. Because the court uses this theory, it does not
find it necessary to discuss the negative equitable easement
theory or the adverse possession arguments. The arguments by
both sides on these questions merit at least some mention. In their
,brief, defendants contended that under Pitts v. BrownP6 a prior
general scheme of development as shown by such evidence as a
development plat and a pattern of restrictions in prior deeds,
gives rise to a negative equitable easement, and thus, the subse-
quent purchaser of a lot in the general scheme takes subject to
the retrictions even when they are omitted from his own deed.37
The plaintiff had countered with the argument that when
claiming adverse possession under color of title, the deed serves
33. McMul. Eq. 157 (S.C. 1841).
34. Cruger v. Daniels, McMul. Eq. 157, 193 (S.C. 1841). This language was
quoted in McCullough v. Urquhart, 248 S.C. 348, 354, 149 S.E2d 909, 912
(1966).
35. McCullough v. Urquhart, 248 S.C. 348, 353, 149 S.E2d 909, 912 (1966).
36. 215 S.C. 122, 54 S.E.2d 538 (1949).
37. Brief for Defendants-Appellants-Respondents at 7, McCullough v. Urqu-
hart, 248 S.C. 348, 149 S.E2d 909 (1966).
[Vol. 19
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only to describe the physical boundaries of the property. Fur-
ther, they argue, in order to apply Pitts, the court would have to
find that the plaintiff possessed by virtue of a deed from the
common grantor, and, the plaintiff contends, this deed is void.
Of course the court ruled out both these arguments by using
estoppel to deny validity of the deed, but assuming the plain-
tiffs could claim by adverse possession, the argument that they
could use the deed for physical description and ignore the restric-
tions therein seems extremely weak. Though there are no South
Carolina cases exactly in point, the master in equity below indi-
cated that he would have held the plaintiff bound by the restric-
tions even if he were to sustain the adverse possession under
color of title claim.38 If the issue were ever squarely before the
Supreme Court of South Carolina it seems entirely likely that
they would take the same view.
The net result of this decision is that McCullough now has a
quiet title, but at what price ?
B. Subdivision Restrictions
Donald E. Baltz, Inc. v. R. V. Ohandler & Co.,3 9 also involved
an alleged violation of a restrictive covenant. Plaintiff Baltz
was the developer of a residential subdivision. The defendant,
owner of a forty acre tract abutting a portion of the subdivision,
admittedly bought a lot in the subdivision for the purpose of
connecting his property to a street entirely within the subdivi-
sion. The road through the lot was intended to connect a trailer
housing defendant's son and daughter-in-law. The subdivision
lots were all subject to the following restrictive covenants:
1. No lot shall be used except for residential purposes ....
3. No trailer . . . shall at any time be used as a residence
temporarily or permanently. . . . 8. This property shall be
used for single family residences only .... 4o
The plaintiff contended that the defendant's use of the lot as a
street was in violation of the restrictive covenants and success-
fully petitioned for a permanent injunction against this use.
Defendant characterized the connection as a driveway, not a
38. Record at 41, McCullough v. Urquhart, 248 S.C. 348, 149 S.E.2d 909
(1966).
39. 248 S.C. 484, 151 S.E.2d 441 (1966). Adopting the method employed by
the court in this case, the defendant and plaintiff viU1 be referred to individ-
ually, rather than by their corporate identity.
40. Id. at 487, 151 S.E2d at 442.
1967]
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street, and contended that the "use" of the lot was for general
residential purposes, even though the actual residence was not
located thereon.
The question of whether the use of a subdivision lot as a means
of access to adjacent property is a violation of the restrictive
covenant limiting use to residential is a novel one in South Caro-
lina. The court points out that under general property and con-
tract law in this area, it is well established that "restrictions as
to the use of real estate should be strictly construed and all
doubts resolved in favor of free use of the property; such cove-
nants, however, should not be construed so as to defeat the plain
and obvious purpose of the contractual instrument."41 Thus,
though this particular use had never been litigated prior to this
case, the contract under discussion seemed to the court too clear
for quarrel when covenants one and eight were read together as
the court does. The court points to the strong language of both
covenants, particularly the use of the word "shall."
Defendants urged the court to consider Bove 'v. G(ebeZ,42 a
very similar factual situation litigated in Ohio, as pursuasive
authority. The defendant emphasized the following language
from Bove:
If it had been the intention of those who prepared these
restrictions to require use not merely "for residence purposes
only" but "for residence purposes in the subdivision only,"
it is apparent that they did not express such an intention.
43
The South Carolina court makes short shrift of this argument
by comparing the very vague language of the Bove covenants
with the emphatic language of the instant restrictions.
Though the court says nothing about the trailer as an influen-
tial factor, one is tempted to conclude that had the defendant's
residence been something closer to the other $19,000 to $25,000
homes instead of a direct affront to the dignity of the subdivision
the court might not have seen these covenants as quite so em-
phatic, clear, and unambiguous.
JEAN HoI _a To
41. Id. at 487, 151 S.E2d at 443, quwting McDonald v. Welborn, 220 S.C. 10,
19, 66 S.E.2d 327, 331 (1951).
42. 169 Ohio St 325, 159 N.E.2d 425 (1959).
43. Id. at 329, 159 N.E.2d at 428.
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